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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2401 
___________ 
 
ELLIOT K. ANDERSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN BLEDSOE 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-00156) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 10, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 25, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Elliot K. Anderson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
We will summarily affirm.  
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I. 
 On July 6, 2011, Anderson received an incident report (No. 2182608) after making 
certain statements to an officer who ordered him to submit to hand restraints before being 
escorted back to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”).  According to the report, Anderson 
repeatedly used expletives while addressing the officer and refused to comply with his 
orders.  (Dkt. No. 12-1, p. 30.)  Anderson was charged with three code violations, 
including Refusing a Program Assignment (Code 306), Insolence Towards a Staff 
Member (Code 312), and Refusing to Obey an Order of a Staff Member (Code 307).  
(Id.) 
 Anderson was given a Notice of Discipline Hearing on July 12, 2011.  (Id. p. 32.)  
The Unit Discipline Committee (“UDC”) referred the charges to a disciplinary hearing 
officer (“DHO”).  The hearing took place before the DHO on July 18, 2011.  Anderson 
appeared at the hearing and denied the charges, claiming that they were “retaliation.”  (Id. 
p. 33.)  He then became hostile and was escorted from the room.  (Id.)  Though Anderson 
chose not to present witnesses, he did request staff representation, and Counselor 
Gambone appeared on his behalf.  (Id. p. 32.)  Gambone stated that there were “no 
discrepancies in the discipline process” and that he received all documentation in 
reference to Anderson’s case.  (Id.)  Gambone also noted that he met with Anderson prior 
to the hearing and that Anderson had no comment for the record.  (Id.)   
The DHO recognized a potential procedural issue with respect to Anderson’s 
contention that the hearing was untimely; that is, because Anderson was “in ambulatory 
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restraints” the “hearing was conducted on [the] 4th day” instead of the third work day 
following the date of the incident report, as suggested by Program Statement (“P.S.”) 
5270.80.  (Dkt. No. 12-1, p. 30, 33.)  The DHO concluded that Anderson’s timeliness 
challenge was not a basis for dismissing the charges, as the delay did not hinder his right 
to due process, his ability to defend himself, or prejudice his defense.  (Id. at 33.) 
 The DHO found that Anderson violated Codes 307 and 312, but expunged the 
charge related to Code 306.  Specifically, the DHO relied on the eyewitness account set 
forth in the incident report and considered, but gave “little weight” to, Anderson’s 
statement denying the charges.  (Id. p. 34.)  Anderson received sanctions for both 
violations, including the loss of vested and non-vested good conduct time.  (Id. p. 35.) 
 On January 26, 2012, Anderson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his due process rights were violated during the 
course of the disciplinary proceedings.  The District Court denied the § 2241 petition on 
April 24, 2012.  (Dkt. No. 13.)  Anderson timely filed a notice of appeal.
1
    
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A challenge to a disciplinary 
action resulting in the loss of good conduct time is properly brought pursuant to § 2241, 
“as the action could affect the duration of the petitioner’s sentence.”  Queen v. Miner, 
                                              
1
 Anderson’s notice of appeal was followed by a motion for post-judgment relief.  The 
District Court denied that motion on October 25, 2012.  (Dkt. No. 25.)  Anderson has not 
appealed that decision.   
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530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the denial of habeas corpus relief de 
novo, exercising plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and applying 
a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 
314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We may summarily affirm the decision of the District Court if no 
substantial question is presented on appeal.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 A prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits.  Vega, 493 F.3d at 317 n.4.  
Thus, when a disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of those credits, an inmate must 
receive (1) written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to any hearing, 
(2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense, and (3) a written 
statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974).  The Supreme Court has held that “revocation 
of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process 
unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the 
record.”   Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The Hill standard is minimal and does not require examination of the 
entire record, an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or even a 
weighing of the evidence.  See Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 1989).  
The relevant inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support the 
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.   
Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Anderson was 
afforded all the process he was due during the disciplinary proceedings.  He received 
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written notice of the disciplinary charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; 
he appeared at the hearing and made a statement refuting the charges; he was given an 
opportunity to present witnesses and provide documentary evidence (though he chose not 
to do so); he was represented by Counselor Gambone; and he was given a written 
statement explaining the DHO’s decision.  See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66.  Further, there 
was some evidence to support the DHO’s decision, in particular, the eyewitness account 
contained in the incident report.
2
  Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.  
Anderson also argued that the DHO ignored the fact that his hearing was untimely.  
The record, however, reflects that the DHO considered Anderson’s procedural challenge 
and determined that it was not a basis for dismissing the charges.  (Dkt. No. 12-1, p. 34.) 
We agree with the District Court that Anderson’s due process rights were not violated by  
the one-day delay, particularly because the three-work-day time period set forth in P.S. 
5270.80 is a guideline, not a requirement.  (Dkt. No. 13, p. 12.)  We also agree with the 
District Court’s conclusions that the DHO imposed appropriate sanctions (id. p. 13) and 
that the DHO did not violate Anderson’s right to due process by failing to recognize an 
alleged conflict of interest with Gambone (id. p. 14).   
III. 
The District Court correctly determined that Anderson was afforded the requisite 
due process during the disciplinary proceedings.  We conclude that no substantial 
                                              
2
 The DHO explained, and the record reflects, that his decision was based on the “greater 
weight of the evidence.”  (Dkt. No. 12-1, p. 34.)  
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question is presented by this appeal, and, accordingly, will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment denying Anderson’s § 2241 petition.   3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6. 
